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APpFAL-REcoo---JurncrAL COGNiZANC-E.-WEsTERN A. R. Co. & HvYa
39 S. E. 447 (Ga.).-Held, That a statement in a brief of evidence, as to a
proceeding in a lower court, that the plaintiff "introduced in evidence the mor-
tality and annuity tables in the 70th Georgia Reports," does not authorize an
appellate court to take judicial cognizance of the contents of the tables pub-
lished by the official reporter as an appendix to that volume. Simmons, C. J.,
and Lewis, J., dissenting.
Under this ruling of the court the plaintiff in error loseshis case because
he failed to bring up in the record a copy of a set of tables whose contents
the law presumes the court to know, and as to which, if it had forgotten them,
it could have refreshed its memory by reference to them as published in its
own reports. This was error, for by the weight of authority courts take judi-
cial notice of the standard mortality and annuity tables without proof. See
x Greenl. Ev. (16th Ed.) 6; 17 Am. Enc. Law (2nd Ed.) goo. In declining to
look beyond the record the court refuses to follow Ragland v. Barringer, 41
Ga. II4, in which it was held that the court could take judicial notice of the
contents of a proclamation issued by the governor of the state, although not
set forth either in the brief of evidence or the bill of exceptions.
BILLS AND NOTES-WAvER OF PROTEST.-WERR v. KoHLES ET AL., 71 N. Y.
Supp. 713.-Plaintiff failed to protest at maturity a promissory note on which
defendant was endorser. A month after maturity defendant paid plaintiff's
husband interest due on note, saying that it was money he owed plaintiff.
Held, in absence of proof that defendant knew of plaintiff's laches, the pay-
ment and statement were insufficient to continue waiver of protest. Adams,
P. J., and Spring, J., dissenting.
While the law is well settled that to constitute a waiver of protest after
maturity, knowledge by the endorser of the holder's laches is necessary, some
uncertainty exists as to whether such knowledge can be inferred from the
endorser's promises and attending circumstances, or whether it must be
clearly proved. Kent in his Commentaries, Vol. III, page 113, says that
"weight of authority is that this knowledge may be inferred as a fact from the
promise under the attending circumstances, without requiring clear and affir-
;native proof." Such is not the weight of authority to-day. The burden of
proof is upon the plaintiff to show that defendant had knowledge of the laches
and it must be made clear to appear. Trimble v. Thorne, 8 Am. Dec. 302 and
note; Tebbest v. Dowd, 23 Wend, 379; Crawford's "Negotiable Instruments
Law," i8o and note.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-PROPERTY IN ANOTHER STATE-ATTACHMENT-Pai-
ORITIES-WHIcH LAW GOVERNS-AULTMAN & TAYLOR MACHINERY CO. V.
KENNEDY, 87 N. W. 435 (Iowa) .- Appeal from district court. Affirmed.
James Kennedy, a resident of North Dakota, on the i4th of March, I898, exe-
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cuted a chattel mortgage on certain personal property temporarily in Iowa, and
certain other personal property in North Dakota, to the Red River National
Bank, who is the intervener in this case. The mortgage was recorded in
North Dakota, where the mortgagee resided. On August 4th, 1898, plaintiff
attached the property located in Iowa. The evidence shows that plaintiff had
actual notice of the chattel mortgage. The trial court awarded the property
to the intervener. Held, notwithstanding that by the laws of North Dakota a
mortgage is void as against creditors of the mortgagor, unless said mortgage
is recorded in the place where the property is situated, the present case must
be determined by the laws of the place where the property is situated, and by
the laws of Iowa such mortgage is good when the creditor has actual notice
of the same.
The court argues that the rule that the lox loci contractus governs when
personality is concerned, is correct as far as the parties to the mortgage are
concerned; but as between the parties the mortgage good in North Dakota,
and the statutory invalidity as to third parties when the goods are in a state
where no such rule exists, is of no effect, since the law of the latter governs.
Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wal. 139. The laws of one state are recognized in
another only by comity and are not compulsory.
This rule, however, would seem to be open to some doubt. Watson v.
Campbell, 38 N. Y. 153.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-NEWSPAPERS-PUBLIC PRINTING-COMPENSATION
-VAN HARLINGEN v. DOYLE, COUNTY AUDITOR, 66 Pac. 44 (Cal.).-The plain-
tiff, a publisher of a newspaper of less than one year's existence, under a con-
tract with the county auditor, printed certain tax lists. Held, that plaintiff
might recover compensation, in spite of a County Government Act, providing
that no printing should be procured of any person whose paper had not been
established in the country for one year or more, such act being in violation of
the provision of the State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 2, that "all laws of a
general nature shall have a uniform operation."
The above act plainly intended to exclude all newspapers not established
in the county from any share in public or official advertising. Laws have gen-
erally been held to have a uniform operation when they apply to all of a class,
but how arbitrary such classes may be made is always a question of doubt
and uncertainty. Smith v. Judge of Twelfth District, 17 Cal. 556; Abeel v.
Clark, 24 Pac. 383; Pasadena v. Stinson, 27 Pac. 6o4; Cooley's Const. Lim.
pp. 389-397. In State v. Mayor of Hoboken, 38 N. J. L. IiO, a contrary view
seems to be taken, the mayor being compelled, under the city charter, to des-
ignate as official organs those newspapers which had been established a year
or more.
CORPORATION-DIsSOLUTION-EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIABILITIEs-AcTION
FOR LIBEL-ABATEMENT AND REViVAL-SHAYNE v. EVENING POST PUB. Co.,
6i N. E. 115 (N. Y.).-The defendant was dissolved by the expiration of the
time limited in its certificate of incorporation. An action for libel against it
was thereby abated and an order was sought reviving it against the former
directors of the defunct corporatioln. Held, that the action may be continued
and revived against the former directors as trustees of the corporation for the
benefit of the stockholders. See Comment.
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INFANTS-PUBLIC POLICY-DANGEROUS EMPLOYENT-INJuRIEs-RGHTS
OF PARENT-TEXAS & P. Ry. Co. v. PUTNAM, 63 S. W. Rep. 91o (Texas).-
A father consented to the employment of a minor son by a railroad company,
and agreed never to trouble the company if the son was injured. Held, that
the father could recover for injuries received by the son, resulting from the
negligence of the company, and not contemplated by, or naturally arising out
of the employment.
The company cites Railroad Co. v. Redeker, 67 Tex. i9o; Railroad Co. v.
Carlton, 6o Tex. 397; and Railroad Co. v. Brick, 83 Tex. 526, etc., but these
cases go no further than to hold that consent of the father will prevent a re-
-covery for injury to a minor child where the ground of the recovery alleged
consists alone in the fact that the minor had been employed in a dangerous
employment. The court holds that a parent may consent to the assumption
of the ordinary risks of the minor's employment, but to give effect to an agree-
ment on the part of the parent, exempting the company from the consequences
of negligence would be contrary to public policy.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-BREACH OF LEASE-ELETION OF REMEDES.-
McCREADY v. LINDENBORN, 71 N. Y. Supp. 355.-Where in the terms of a lease
the parties stipulated, in case of refusal of the tenant to occupy the premises
and pay rent, as to what should be the remedy of the landlord, the measure
of damages and how and when ascertained, it was Held, that the landlord need
not follow the stipulations of the lease as to the remedy but could bring an
action for breach of contract.
A rather unusual situation in regard to election of remedies is presented
in this case. For failure to perform an ordinary contract, the injured party
may always elect whether he will sue upon the contract to enforce the cove-
nants or treat the contract as broken and sue for damages. Railway Co. v.
Richards, 152 Ill. 59; and the same principle applies to leases. Driggs v.
Dwight, 31 Am. Dec. 283. The court here extends the principle somewhat,
holding that a right of election exists even where the terms of the lease spe-
cifically provide for the remedy which shall follow the breach. The position
of the dissenting judge would seem to be the correct view, that where par-
ties make a contract they should be held to its terms and the remedy stipulated
should be exclusive. Hall v. Gould, 13 N. Y. 127.
LARCENY-EVIDENcE-TRAILiNG By BLOODHOUND-STATE v. MOORE, 39 S. E.
626 (N. E.).-In a trial for larceny the prosecution introduced evidence of
the conduct of a bloodhound to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice.
Held, that such evidence was inadmissible.
The exercise by animals of an instinctive power, not possessed by human
beings, is a novel feature of evidence in our jurisprudence. It was rejected
in this case, howelrer, not upon the ground that the dog, being an animal of
instinct and not possessed of reason, his conduct would not be a circumstance
to be considered in connecting a person with an act, but upon the ground that
the conduct in question did not in reality corroborate the testimony offered.
The cases in which the conduct of a dog has been used as evidence are very
rare. In Hodge v. State, 98 Ala. 1o, it appears that tracks of a peculiar char-
acter was found near a house in which murder was committed; that a dog
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trained to follow human tracks was put upon them and that they were trailed
by him to the house of the defendant, who, when arrested, had on shoes that
made tracks precisely like those traced by the dog. In that case the court
held that the conduct of the dog was competent to go to the jury as a cir-
cumstance tending to connect the defendant with the crime. See also, Pedigo
v. Co., 44 S. W. 143.
LAw GOVERNING CONTRACT-STIPULATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY
PER NEGLIGENCE-CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-Loss OF BAGGAGE-VALIDITY OF
LIMITATION.-THE NEW ENGLAND, IIO Fed. (Mass.), 415-A provision in a
steamship ticket, issued by an English company to a passenger in the United
States from America to an English port, that the company would not be liable
for loss or injury to baggage in excess of fifty dollars, and that all questions
arising under the contract should be determined according to English law.
Held, to be ineffectual to exempt the company from liability for the negligence
of its servants in respect to such baggage, and, that the limtiation to fifty dol-
lars was unreasonable and therefore invalid.
In England such a provision relating to the liability of a common carrier
is invalid, and inasmuch as the parties to the contract expressly stipulated the
law by which it was to be govdrned the provision would have been good in so
far as the question of intention enters into the case, but such provisions are
held to be contrary to public policy in the United States and cannot stand.
The case of The Oranmore (D. C.) 24 Fed. 922, affirmed in 92 Fed. 396, (but
without any statement of reasons), disregarded this question of public policy
and based a contrary decision wholly on the expressed intention of the contrac-
tors. The authority of this case is clearly outweighted by the views of other
inferior federal courts in The Kensington, 94 Fed. 885; The Etergia (D. C.)
56 Fed. 124; Lewisohn v. S. S. Co. (D. C.), 56 Fed. 6o2; The Hugo (D. C.)
57 Fed. 403; The Tleumavis (D. C.) 56 Fed. 472. The Supreme Court has
declined to pass directly on the question, but if there is any implied opinion
one way or another it favors the view of the judge in this case. In Knott v.
Worsted Botany Mills, 179 0. S. 69, a stipulation that the law of England
should govern was held ineffective against the provisions of the Harter Act.
A valuation agreed upon by both parties is in some cases taken as a reason
for permitting the carrier to limit his liability. Graves v. Ry., 137 Mass. 33,
34. But to be valid such limitation must be reasonable. The Majestic, 166
0. S. 375, expresses a doubt as whether it was reasonable in the case of a first-
cabin passenger crossing the Atlantic in a first-class steamer. A $ioo limit
is reasonable in the case of a passenger on a Fall River steamboat. The
Priscilla (D. C.) io6 Fed. 739.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-DEFECTIVE STREETs-EXEMPTION FROM LIABIL-
ITY-CONSTITUTIONALITY.-MATTSON V. CITY OF ASTORIA, 65 IPac. 1O66 (Os.).-
A city charter, vesting in the mayor and council the control of streets, but
providing that neither the mayor nor any member of the council should be
liable in damages for injuries arising from any defective street, is in violation
of Art. I, Sec. io of the State Constitution, which guarantees to every person
a remedy by due course of law for any injury done him.
It is settled that the legislature may exempt a city from liability for inju-
ries caused by defective streets. O'Harra v. City of Portland, 3 Or. 525. But
rr8
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unless otherwise provided by statute officers, to whom is delegated the duty
of keeping the streets in repair, are liable in damage to those injured by their
neglect. Bennett v. Whitney, 94 N. Y. 302; Amy v. Supervisors, ii Wall. 136;
Tearney v. Smith, 86 III. 391; Shear & R. Neg. (sth ed.) Sec. 313.
Similar provisions are contained in the constitutions of many states, and
are to the intent that courts must afford a remedy for every wrong that is recog-
nized by the law of the land. Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433; Flanders v.
Town of Merrimack, 48 Wis. 567; Fitzpatrick v. Slocum, 89 N. Y. 358.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-GRANTING OF FRANCHISE TO A WATER
-COMPANY-SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF RATES BY ORDINANCE-FREEPORT
WATER COMPANY V. CITY OF FREEPORT. 21 SUP. CT. 493- Under a statutory
provision the defendant had enacted an ordinance giving to the plaintiff com-
pany the exclusive right to supply the City of Freeport with water for thirty
years. The statute provided that "the rates to be charged shall be such as
may be fixed by ordinance." The ordinance granting the charter fixed the
rates, but subsequently the city passed another which substantially reduced
them. Held, that such an ordinance did not violate the United States Consti-
tution, as impairing the obligation of a contract. White, Brown, Brewer, and
Peckham, J. J., dissenting.
The above decision centered around the wordsrof the statute, " rates- - -
- fixed by ordinance," i. e.; whether they were to be construed to meanfixed by
ordinance, once for all to endure during the whole period of thirty years; or fixed
by ordinance from time to time as might be deemed necessary. It is elementary
that the power of a municipal corporation to grant exclusive privileges must be
conferred by explicit terms. Detroit Citizens' Street R. Co. v. Detroit R. Co.,
171 U. S. 48. Following out this principle, the majority of the court maintained
that if the power given to the municipalities of the state had been intended to
have but one exercise, and, having exercised it, the municipalities were to be
bound for thirty years, it would have been plainly so expressed in the statute.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCE-SUNDAY PUB-
LICATION-DumARS ET AL. V. CITY OF DENVER ET AL., 65 PAC. 580 (CoLo.).-
Where a city charter provided that no ordinance should take effect until pub-
lished in some newspaper, held that one publication, in a Sunday newspaper,
of an ordinance authorizing the construction of a sewer, being in the nature
of service of process, was of no effect and rendered void all the proceedings
which followed it.
At common law no judgment could be rendered or process awarded by a
court on Sunday. Swan v. Broome, 3 Burrow 1595; Hiller v. English, 4
Strob. L. 486. Whether or not civil processes and summons may be issued on
Sunday depends upon whether the particular state has adopted the statute 29
Car. II C. 7. In Ohio, the statute 29 Car. II c. 7 is not in force, and hence the
publication in a Sunday newspaper of an ordinance with respect to a street
improvement, such ordinance being a civil process, is valid. Hastings v.
City of Columbus, 42 Ohio St 585. The present decision follows. Ormsby v.
City of Louisville, 79 Ky. 197. See also Schwed v'. Hartwitz, 23 Colo. 187;
Scammon v. Chicago, 40 III. 296: McLaughlin v. Wheeler, So N. W. 834.
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OFFICERS-INSPECTION OF- VESSELS-RIGHT TO SALARY-JOHN
GLAVEY, SUPT., V. UNITED STATES; 21 SUP. CT. 891.-The plaintiff was a
local inspector of vessels at New Orleans. At the time he entered upon his
office his duties did not extend to vessels of a foreign nation. Subsequently,
however, Congress passed an act making such vessels liable to inspection, and,
to carry intb effect its provisions, appointed officers, designated as special
inspectors of foreign vessels, at a salary of two thousand dollars per annum.
While still being retained as local inspector the plaintiff was appointed special
inspector of foreign vessels in New Orleans, with the stipulation, however, that
he should exercise the functions of this office without additiohal compensation.
He served three years in his two-fold capacity, and then sued for his salary as
foreign inspector. Held, that he could recover. Brewer, Brown, Peckham,
and McKenna, J. J., dissenting.
This case involves the interesting discussion of whether an appbintee
under a statute can be compelled to accept a less salary than the statute pre-
scribes. From the cases it would seem that the mere acceptance and discharge
of the duties of the office is not a waiver of the statutory provisions fixing the
salary therefor. Peofile ex rel Satterlee v. Board of Police, 75 N. Y. 38;
Uuited Statesw. Bostwick, 94 N. S. 53. In Miller v. United States, 1o3 Fed.
Rep. 413, the court said, "any bargain whereby, in advance of his appointment
to an office with a fixed salary, the appointee attempts to agree with the indi-
viduals making the appointment that he will accept something less than the
statutory sum, is contrary to public policy, and should not be tolerated by the
courts. The reasoning of the dissenting judges does not appear.
STABBING-INDICTMENT-HENDERSON V. STATE, 3 9 S. E. 446 (GA.).-An
alternative charge in an indictment that the accused cut and stabbed a named
person with a knife "or some other like instrument," renders the accusation
bad on special demurrer. Lewis, J., dissenting.
In State v. Gilbert, 13 Vt. 647, it was held that an indictment describing a
stolen horse as of a "bay or brown" color was not bad, the disjunctive being
really synonymous with "to wit." And if that which follows the disjunctive
can be properly construed to be merely descriptive of that which precedes it,
or if it can be considered mere surplusage, the alternative statement will not
make the indictment fatally defective. State v. Hester, 48 Ark. 40; State v.
Corrigan, 24 Conn. 286. Here it cannot be said that the alternative means the
same thing as "knife," nor are the words explanatory, for they distinctly refer
to some other 'instrument. And while in fact such words add little, yet no
averment in an indictment can be rejected as surplusage which is descriptive
either of the offense or of the manner in which it is committed. Hornsby v.
State, 74 Ala. 56.
TRADE NAME-WRONGFUL USE-RIGHT OF DESCENDANTS TO
NAMES-ABBREVIATION. WYCKOFF v. HowE SCALE CO., OF 1886, IiO FED.
520.
Defendant was engaged as sales agent of the Remington-Scholes Com-
pany, and justified its use of the name "Remington-Scholes" under that com-
pany. Plaintiffs acquired from the original manufacturers of the Remington
typewriters the sole right to use the name "Remington" as a name for type-
writers. Thereafter descendants of the original manufacturers, also named
"Remington," became members of a corporation making typewriters under the
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name of .Scholes, whereupon the name was changed to the "Remington-
Scholes." Later the abbreviated form "Rem-Sho" was adopted. Held, that
since ultimate purchasers of typewriters might be led to think that the addition
of the name "Scholes" was a new style of the old machine coming from the
same source, such use of the name " Remington" was an attempt to deceive
the public, and unwarranted. No special right to use a family name which has
become a trade-name accrues by virtue of the relation which the descendants
bear to the original manufacturer of the same name, such descendants being
entitled to no other than their natural rights to use their own names in the trans-
action of their own business. The subsequent shortening of this name to
"Rem-Sho" was not such a change of the term as would guard purchasers
against the belief that these were not Remington machines.
That the name "Remington-Scholes" was actually deceptive appears in
the evidence of this case. In the case of Howe v. The Howe Mfachine Com-
l0any, 50 Barb. 236, it was held, that where a certain A. B. Howe manufactured
a machine for several years under the name of "Howe," his brother, Elias
Howe, Jr., who was the inventor and who had given his brother license to use
the patent, had no right to use his own surname in such a way as to deceive
the public and deprive his brother of the notoriety and market which his
machines had gained. So he was restrained, although he used the name in good
faith. See also Crofut v. Day, 7 Bear, 184, where bad faith was evident.
TELEGRAMS-NEGLIGENCE IN TRANSMISSION-CONDITIONS-WESTERN
UNION TEL. Co. V. WAXELBAUM, 39 S. E. 443 (GA.).-A telegram written upon
the printed form of the Postal Tel. Co. was given to the Western Union for
transmission. Held, in an action against ihe Western Union for negligence in
transmission, that the sender was bound by all reasonable conditions pnnted on
the form used.
Where the message is not written on the blanks provided by the company,
.and yet is received for transmission by the company's agent, the sender is in
general not bound by the stipulations printed on the usual message blanks.
PearselIv. Western Union Co., 124 N. Y. 256. This rule applies, although a
regulation of the company forbids its employes to transmit messages unless
they are written on the printed blanks. Beasly v,. Western Union Co.,39 Fed.
Rep. i81. But in this case the court declines to hold that the telegram in ques-
tion was as to the Western Union Co. one not upon condition. For although it
was in form a contract with an entirely different com pany, yet the delivery and
acceptance of the message was in effect an adoption by the parties of theblank
contract made in the name of the other company, and the parties were bound
by its reasonable terms.
TRUSTEE-INTEREST ON FUNDS.-MATHEWSON ET AL, V. DAvIs ET AL.,
61 N. E. 68, (ILL.).-The defendant received from a third party money to be
paid.the plaintiff for certain lands on the perfecting of the title thereof. This
money he deposited in his own name with money of his own, and for several
years, the title to the land not having been perfected, drew checks against the
deposit. Several times there was less money on his account than the amount
of the trust fund. Held, that he was not liable for interest upon it. Magruder,
J., dissenting.
Where a trustee deposits trust funds in his own name and mingles them
with his own funds, he is liable for interest. Bisp6ham on Eq. §zx, Perry on
Trusts, §468; Utica Ins. Co. v. Lynch et al., ii, Page 520. A distinction is
sought to be drawn on the ground that at any time the defendant might have
been called upon to pay over the money. He had the credit and use of the
money for several years, with the profit necessarily resulting therefrom. This
decision seems too great a softening of the strict rule that a trustee may not
take profit from his position.
